|
|
Law - Case Law Precedents
It has become convenient to use precedents in
order to control the outcome of your case as we, the ‘pond
life’, are not expected to complain too much, and when
we do we then become called vexatious, frivolous or obsessive.
Stick to Human Rights law and don’t give
ammunition to the enemy to trample over your rights to not
suffer inhuman and degrading treatment, the right to family
life, the right to a fair hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal, the right to not suffer discrimination etc.
For those wishing to use precedents where strongly
in favour, there is a summary list of important cases below:
- the leading case on calculating the size of
the lump sum needed to produce an annual income over a number
of years
- a case considering dishonest conduct by one
spouse, involving transfers of assets abroad, against the
background of substantial assets, and the effect of such conduct
on the award.
- a complex international children’s case which was
the subject of significant publicity , dealing with the circumstances
in which publicity about a hearing should be restrained.
- the groundbreaking
case on division of financial assets on divorce in which the
House of Lords criticised the approach taken by the lower
courts for many years –the significance of this case
is explored further in hot topics.
D v D (Lump Sum: Adjournment of Application) [2001] 1 FLR
633 - a case concerning assets of over £700,000
in which the court confirmed that ‘big money’
cases were not just those in which the parties could afford
a clean break, and upheld the judge’s decision to adjourn
the decision whether to order a lump sum until after the size
of the husband’s bonus was known.
- a case in which
an equal division of the assets could only be achieved by
sale of a company owned by the husband – the court gave
the husband a number of years to organise this, to preserve
as far as possible the value of the company.
- an important review
by the Court of Appeal of the principles in White, emphasising
that the court’s goal was a fair outcome, rather than
equality, and identifying a number of factors justifying a
departure from equality, including the husband’s creative
genius (the wife received 38% and the husband 62%).
M v M (Pre-nuptial Agreement) [2001] 2 FLR 654 - the first
reported case in which the court took account of a pre-nuptial
agreement in dividing up matrimonial assets – the wife
was not restricted to the amount in the agreement, but the
existence of the agreement tended to reduce the award.
*R (Litigant in Person) (Nos 1 and 2) [2002] 1 FLR 432
- a case involving both children and financial matters. in
which the Court of Appeal set out some observations on the
appropriate way to treat a litigant in person, and upheld
the appointment of a receiver to enforce a financial order,
in certain circumstances.
Al-Khatib v Masry [2002] 1 FLR 1053 - a case in which
the judge awarded the wife over £23 million, notwithstanding
the husband’s failure to disclose his assets properly,
including a sum to enable the wife to conduct litigation in
Saudi Arabia to try to recover the children.
-
a case in which the Court of Appeal decided that an agreement
reached between the parties at a financial dispute resolution
appointment (FDR), which had been approved by the FDR judge,
was an order of the court, from which neither party could
back down.
*Lambert v Lambert [2002] - a case in which the Court
of Appeal held that special contribution could not be demonstrated
merely by the size of the fortune made, and could be argued
only in exceptional circumstances, and also warned against
courts giving detailed consideration to the nature of the
contribution made by the parties.
– a case in which the Court of Appeal decided that where
a husband and wife had arranged their affairs during the marriage
to achieve equality and to elimate any potential for gender
discrimination, equal division of family assets was the overwhelmingly
obvious solution.
Re P; P v T (Child: Financial Provision) [2003] –
a case in which the Court of Appeal set out the way in which
the court should approach applications for financial provision
for a child of unmarried parents where one or both of the
parents was wealthy.
– a case in which the Court of Appeal held
that there was no jurisdiction to re-distribute the capital
assets on an application to capitalise periodical payments.
– a case in which it was accepted by a deputy High Court
judge that the assumed equality of value of financial and
domestic contributions only applied to marriages of substantial
length, and that assets brought into the marriage, including
a fully developed career and earning capacity, might qualify
as a contribution justifying a departure from equality.
– a case in which the Court
of Appeal commented on the application of the current costs
regime to big money cases.
case details
-the leading case on calculating the size of the lump sum
needed to produce an annual income over a number of years.
The husband had substantial assets, following the sale of
his business which had been built up during the marriage.
The wife was awarded £1.1 million, £575,000 of
which was for an income fund intended to produce £36,000
a year. The calculation of such income funds in matrimonial
proceedings should be based on a rate of return of 4.25% top
- a case considering
dishonest conduct by one spouse, involving transfers of assets
abroad, against the background of substantial assets, and
the effect of such conduct on the award.
The husband and wife were married for 18 years and had four
children. The husband was employed by a company controlled
by the wife's father, and every year the wife's father augmented
the husband's salary to support the husband and wife's expenditure,
and occasionally made significant capital contributions. Shortly
after the failure of a business which had been financed by
a gift from the wife's father, the husband transferred £85,000,
(part of another gift) into a Swiss bank account, concealing
this by pretending that the family had spent the money. Some
years later the husband spent some of the transferred money
on his mistress. After the affair was revealed he left his
wife, and resigned from his job. It had proved difficult for
him to find employment, and, having little income, he had
exhausted his assets and now owed about £45,000, plus
the legal costs which he had borrowed from his family. The
wife owned the matrimonial home, now worth £1.75 million,
and other property worth about £55,000. The wife's father
was prepared to support the wife, and the children, but not
to contribute anything to the husband. The court ruled that
the husband's conduct did not disqualify him from all relief,
although it could not be disregarded. It was in the children's
interests that their father should be securely and adequately
housed, even if that meant moving to a smaller home themselves.
They needed to be able to keep respect as well as affection
for him. However, in these exceptional circumstances, the
property should revert to the children on his death. top
-
a complex international children’s case which was the
subject of significant publicity, dealing with the circumstances
in which publicity about a hearing should be restrained.
M, a well-known writer, sought injunctions restraining his
former wife, A, and her new partner from publicising information
about court proceedings which concerned custody of the children,
and allegations about M’s fitness to have custody. A
had made various allegations to the press, and had threatened
to publish further allegations on the Internet.
Injunctions were granted on the basis of the court’s
jurisdiction to restrain any act by a parent which, if unrestrained,
would or might adversely affect the welfare of the child.
There was evidence that unless there were further injunctions
A and her partner would attempt to publicise their claims,
some of which had been found to be untrue by the court. The
children were highly likely to suffer damage if the allegations
were repeated or asserted in the media. The welfare of children
could be adversely affected not only by the publication of
previously confidential material, but also by repetition of
material which had already been placed in the public domain.
top
- the groundbreaking case on division of financial assets
on divorce in which the House of Lords criticised the approach
taken by the lower courts for many years – the significance
of this case is further considered in hot topics.
The husband and wife both worked full-time in the family dairy
farm. This farm had been purchased jointly, with help from
the husband’s father, and the husband had inherited
another farm some years later. The overall net assets were
assessed as being about £4.6 million. The couple had
been married for 30 years and had had three children. The
first judge awarded just over one fifth of the total assets
to the wife. The Court of Appeal increased the award to a
level which meant that the husband would almost certainly
have to sell the farm, but the wife was unhappy that she had
received less than half.
The House of Lords considered the law on division of financial
assets on divorce, and criticised the way in which the courts
had been applying the relevant statute. Their two key points
were (i) that in seeking to achieve a fair outcome in dividing
the property of a divorced husband and wife, there was no
place for discrimination between husband and wife and their
respective roles, and (ii) that the courts could order an
unequal division in big money cases, but should only do so
if there were good reasons for doing so. top
-
a case concerning assets of over £700,000 in which the
court confirmed that ‘big money’ cases were not
just those in which the parties could afford a clean break,
and upheld the judge’s decision to adjourn the decision
whether to order a lump sum until after the size of the husband’s
bonus was known.
The assets of the husband and wife exceeded £700,000,
the husband had an annual net income of £230,000, and
there was a surplus of income over expenditure of £120,000
pa. The wife received 53% of the joint assets immediately
available, and the husband was ordered to pay the wife £3,055.55
per month. The judge adjourned the wife’s application
for a lump sum order, until after the husband’s forthcoming
bonus was known, and the husband appealed
The court held that whether or not White v White was intended
to be limited to ‘big money’ cases, this was clearly
a ‘big money’ case, even though there was not
enough money to order a clean break. A court which decided
to adjourn an application for a lump sum was doing no more
than exercising the discretion vested in it, although it should
only do so in the rare cases in which justice to both parties
could only be done if there was an adjournment. A relevant
circumstance was likely to be the real possibility of capital
from a specific source becoming available in the near future,
as there had been in this case. top
- a case in which an equal division of the assets could only
be achieved by sale of a company owned by the husband –
the court gave the husband a number of years to organise this,
to preserve as far as possible the value of the company.
Following the breakdown of a 14-year marriage, the wife sought
an overall clean break settlement of £1.3 million. The
husband was offering £550,000. The total assets were
estimated at nearly £2.6 million, of which the chief
element was an estimated £1.75 million interest, after
capital gains tax, in a successful group of companies in the
services industry (held as an investment). The husband also
had an annual income from his accountancy firm of over £120,000
gross.
The court awarded the wife £1 million. The judge was
very concerned to ensure that his order should not damage
the family’s financial security, and gave the husband
some years to sell the company in order to pay the money awarded,
to preserve as far as possible the value of the company. The
company was not, in any circumstances, to be identified. He
noted that the court must be creative and sensitive to achieve
an orderly redistribution of wealth, particularly where that
involved the realisation of assets owned by either of the
parties.
top
- an important
review by the Court of Appeal of the principles in White,
emphasising that the court’s goal was a fair outcome,
rather than equality, and identifying a number of factors
justifying a departure from equality, including the husband’s
creative genius (the wife received 38% and the husband 62%).
The husband and wife had been married for over 35 years, and
had two children. The considerable assets of the family, about
£11.5 million, had been built up entirely during the
marriage. The judge made an order which gave the wife about
£3.2 million, noting that her contribution to the business,
while not insignificant, had not been particularly important
by comparison with the husband’s entrepreneurial flair
and drive.
The Court of Appeal increased the total value of the award
to the wife to about £4.4 million, leaving the husband
with £7.1 million. The Court emphasised that the objective
in ancillary relief was not equality, but fairness. Although
the fair outcome would sometimes be a more or less equal division
of the assets, more often it would not. The reasons justifying
a departure from equality might be many and varied. In evaluating
contributions the traditional role of women was not to be
valued lower than the role of breadwinner, and the size of
an award could not be limited by reference to ‘reasonable
requirements’. The Court noted that the decision in
White meant there was now a greater need for legislation in
this area, because there was now less predictability, not
more. The factors in favour of increasing the wife’s
award were: ‘reasonable requirements’ should no
longer be used to establish a ceiling to the wife’s
award; any discriminatory bias in favour of the wealth-creator
should be discarded; and the wife’s legitimate wish
to leave money in her will should be recognised. However,
counter-balancing factors included the husband’s continuing
need to exercise his business talents, which might require
investment of capital, and recognition of the husband’s
creative genius. The assessment of assets must be at the date
of the trial or appeal. Exceptions to that rule were rare,
and probably confined to cases where one party had deliberately
or recklessly wasted assets in anticipation of trial. top
-
the first reported case in which the court took account of
a pre-nuptial agreement in dividing up matrimonial assets
– the wife was not restricted to the amount in the agreement,
but the fact that she had agreed to limit her entitlement
did tend to reduce the award.
Very shortly before the marriage, the couple entered into
a pre-nuptial agreement which limited the wife’s financial
entitlement on divorce to £275,000. The couple were
married for five years, and had one child. Following separation
the wife sought a lump sum of £1,300,000. The wife argued
that she should not be kept to the terms of the agreement
because she had been pressured into it (she had been pregnant
at the time).
The judge awarded the wife £875,000, noting that while
the agreement did not dictate her entitlement, it had been
borne in mind as one of the more relevant circumstances of
the case, and had tended to guide the court to a more modest
award than might have been made without it. It would have
been as unjust to the husband to ignore the existence of the
agreement as it would have been to the wife to hold her strictly
to its terms.top
- a case involving both children and financial matters in
which the Court of Appeal set out some observations on the
appropriate way to treat a litigant in person, and upheld
the appointment of a receiver to enforce a financial order,
in certain circumstances.
(No. 1) The husband presented his own case in the hearing
concerning residence of the children, but walked out before
the judgment, stating that he would not receive a fair trial.
The judge considered that the husband’s conduct of the
case had been unreasonable, and that the husband’s behaviour
during the proceedings was a factor which he could take into
account in deciding to reduce the husband’s contact
with the children (for a limited period), and in requiring
the husband to pay indemnity costs.
The Court of Appeal critcised the judge for intervening excessively
during the proceedings, and for overreacting to the father’s
withdrawal from the proceedings, increased the father’s
contact with the children, and reduced the costs to standard
costs.
(No 2) The husband had claimed that his chief asset, a building,
could not be sold or mortgaged for technical legal reasons.
The judge awarded the wife £1.9 million in addition
to her existing assets, which included a family home, with
periodical payments until the lump sum was paid, and awarded
her indemnity costs. There was no evidence of any potential
source of the money, other than the building. To ensure that
the husband obeyed the order, the judge imposed a receiver
on the husband, in respect of the husband’s entitlement
to rent from the building. The receiver was authorised to
enter into negotiations for a sale of the building (but not
to effect any sale without the approval of the court).
The Court of Appeal allowed the husband’s appeal to
a limited extent, but did not reduce the lump sum to be paid,
merely required it to be paid by instalments. The Court deleted
the power of the receiver to negotiate for the sale of the
building, but did not interfere with the receiver’s
role in collecting the rent, and using it to pay the lump
sum. The Court noted that where there was likely to be a complex
financial relationship between the parties, appointment of
a receiver, albeit expensive, would ensure fair play if there
was any doubt about the willingness of either party to play
fair. top
- a
case in which the judge awarded the wife over £23 million,
notwithstanding the husband’s failure to disclose his
assets properly, plus £2.5 million to enable the wife
to conduct litigation in Saudi Arabia to try to recover the
children.
For a number of years the husband, a Saudi businessman, refused
to file any formal evidence or to disclose his income and
assets. He abducted the children from their home in England,
taking them to Saudi Arabia in contempt of court. The court
had ruled that certain properties were in fact owned by the
husband, although the husband had attempted to conceal their
true ownership by means of sham trusts and transfers of shares.
The husband had been warned that his continued failure to
disclose his assets could result in the court drawing its
own inferences about his fortune. The wife claimed that the
husband was worth about $200 million, and sought an award
of £24 million. Although the husband did eventually
file a Form E, the wife was able to identify a number of instances
of non-disclosure and inconsistency.
The judge awarded the wife over £23 million and a fighting
fund of £2.5 million to allow her to litigate in Saudi
Arabia, to try to recover the children. The judge considered
that there was a compelling case for drawing adverse inferences
against the husband in the light of his serious and persistent
litigation misconduct. The court was only entitled to draw
inferences from the evidence before it, but there was sufficient
evidence from many sources to justify a finding that the full
extent of the family assets was well in excess of £50
million, and the court was satisfied that the wife was being
given no more than one half the family assets. If the conclusion
reached was unfair or unjust to the husband, he had only himself
to blame. top
- a case in
which the Court of Appeal held that an agreement reached between
the parties at a financial dispute resolution appointment
(FDR), which had been approved by the FDR judge, was an order
of the court, from which neither party could back down.
At the FDR the judge indicated how much he thought the wife
should receive. After some time in negotiation, the wife offered
to accept a sum a little under that suggested by the judge.
The husband rejected his legal team’s advice that he
consider the offer overnight, and accepted the wife’s
proposal. The parties informed the judge, who expressed his
approval. There was insufficient time on the day to reduce
the agreement to writing, and that was done later. However,
before the draft order could be entered on the court record,
the husband expressed his dissatisfaction with the agreement,
which he claimed had been obtained under duress. The husband
wanted to take the case on to court.
The Court of Appeal held that once the agreement had been
approved by the judge, it had become an unperfected order
of the court, that is an order of the court which need only
be entered on the court record. Neither party could be released
from an unperfected order unless they had, at the very least,
exceptional circumstance and strong reasons. None of the husband’s
criticisms justified a departure from the court’s order.
The whole purpose and effect of the FDR would be lost or compromised
if the parties were free to analyse and re-evaluate a crucial
decision made at the FDR and to decide on further reflection
that they had made the wrong choice. The Court of Appeal also
approved the approach taken by the judge who conducted the
FDR. top
- a case
in which the Court of Appeal held that special contribution
could only be argued in exceptional circumstances, and could
not be demonstrated merely by the size of the fortune made,
and also warned against courts giving detailed consideration
to the nature of the contribution made by the parties.
The husband and wife were married for 23 years, and had two
children, both now at university. The sale of shares in the
husband’s company had generated over £26 million
for the family, of which £6 million had been put into
trust for the children. In the ancillary relief proceedings
the husband’s case was that he had launched his company
and set it on a successful path prior to the marriage, that
its success during the marriage was the result of his drive
and initiative, and that the final sale price had been achieved
by his special negotiating skill. He claimed that he had made
an exceptional contribution to the creation of the family
fortune, which significantly outweighed the full domestic
contribution of the wife. The wife sought 50% of the total
assets on the basis that her contribution had been equal.
The judge awarded the wife £7.5 million, 37% of the
assets, leaving the husband with 63% of the assets.
The Court of Appeal allowed the wife’s appeal, on the
basis that this was not a case of special contribution, and
simply discriminated against the wife’s domestic contribution.
Special contribution remained a legitimate possibility, but
only in exceptional circumstances; a good idea, initiative,
entrepreneurial skills and extensive hard work were insufficient.
It was not possible to argue that simply because the husband
had made a very large sum of money, he had made a special
contribution; that would be almost bound to lead to discrimination
since there was no equal opportunity for the homemaker to
demonstrate the scale of her comparable success. Without some
exceptional and individual quality in the person who made
the fortune it would be hard to establish a case for special
contribution. Further, the duty of the court to assess each
and every one of the s 25(2) criteria bearing on outcome did
not require a detailed critical appraisal of the performance
of each of the parties during the marriage. Couples who could
not agree division were entitled to seek a judicial decision
without exposing themselves to the intrusion, indignity and
possible embarrassment of such an appraisal. The Court did
draw a distinction between equality of contribution and equality
of division; a finding of equality of contribution might be
followed by an order for unequal division because of the influence
of one or more of the other statutory criteria as well as
the over-arching search for fairness. top
– a case in which the Court of Appeal decided that where
a husband and wife had arranged their affairs during the marriage
to achieve equality and to elimate any potential for gender
discrimination, equal division of family assets was the overwhelmingly
obvious solution.
The husband and wife, both aged 44, were married for over
20 years. They had launched a family company during the marriage,
both working hard to make the company a success. In the financial
provision hearing following the divorce, the judge awarded
the wife 54.3% of the assets, assessed to be over £2,500,000.
The husband appealed, arguing that the wife should not have
received more than half of the family assets.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting that, as a
matter of principle, judges should give considerable weight
to the property arrangements made during the marriage, and
in cases where the parties have opted for equality, use their
power to adjust the parties’ financies only if fairness
obviously demanded some reordering. The Court ordered a payment
to the wife resulting in equal division of the assets, and
ordered that the parents should contribute equally to future
education costs, as equal division of assets should ordinarily
be matched by equal division of obligation.top
– a case in which the
Court of Appeal set out the way in which the court should
approach applications for financial provision for a child
of unmarried parents where one or both of the parents was
wealthy.
The mother and father were not married, and had never cohabited
in the conventional sense, although their relationship had
lasted for a number of years. The mother applied for various
separate lump sums, including £1.2 to £2.3 million
with which to house herself and the child, £135,000
for furnishing the property, almost £60,000 for a car,
and £700,000 to meet education costs, plus periodical
payments in favour of the child of about £170,000 pa.
The father was, in his own words, fabulously wealthy and conceded
that his means were such that he could, without financial
embarrassment, raise and pay any sum which the court might
order for the benefit of the child. The judge ordered periodical
payments of £35,360 pa, to be varied downwards after
the child’s 7th birthday, plus capital of £450,000
for housing, £30,000 for furnishings, and £20,000
for a car. The judge noted that the court had to guard against
unreasonable claims made on the child’s behalf with
the disguised element of providing for the mother’s
benefit rather than the child.
Offering guidance to trial courts on the proper approach in
exercising this highly discretionary jurisdiction, the Court
of Appeal allowed the appeal, awarding the wife periodical
payments of £70,000 pa, plus capital of over £1
million, on the basis that while the mother had no personal
entitlement to support, she was entitled to an allowance as
the child’s primary carer, and was entitled to accommodation
which reflected the father’s wealth. The carer ought
to have control of a budget which reflected the position ,
social and financial, of the parents. In a case such as this,
in which both parents lay somewhere on the spectrum from affluent
to fabulously rich, the starting point was to decide, at least
in general terms, the home which ought to be provided for
the child.top
– a case in which the Court of Appeal held that there
was no jurisdiction to re-distribute the capital assets on
an application to capitalise periodical payments.
The wife’s financial claims were settled under a consent
order which included periodical payments of £36,000
pa. The wife then moved from an unmortgaged flat in central
London to a property in Ireland. Two years later she sold
the Irish property at a loss, and moved back to a lower level
of accommodation in London, partially financed by a mortgage.
In the meantime the husband had prospered, earning considerably
more than had been expected, and growing his capital assets,
although he had now retired. The wife sought to have her periodical
payments order increased to £60,000 pa, and to have
that order capitalised as a lump sum of over £800,000.
At trial the husband accepted that the wife’s periodical
payments should increase, but argued that he should not be
forced to capitalise them. The judge found that the wife’s
reasonable future needs were £47,000 pa, including the
cost of servicing the mortgage, and that the correct capitalisation
of those needs was £635,000. The judge also gave the
wife £25,000 to compensate her for the loss of a holiday
home. However, he awarded a total of £740,000, because
he considered on the authority of Cornick v Cornick (No 3)
[2001] 2 FLR 1240, that fairness required an uplift to the
capitalisation. The husband appealed, arguing that the judge
had no jurisdiction to redistribute capital assets on an application
for capitalisation of periodical payments, and that in any
event the judge had been wrong to include the wife’s
mortgage repayments in her future needs.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, awarding the wife
only £655,000, and noting that where it had become possible
to achieve a clean break in such a case the court’s
function was not to reopen capital claims but to replace the
periodical payments order with a sum which was fair compensation.
There was no power or discretion to further adjust capital
distribution to reflect the outcome of unwise or unfortunate
investment on one side or prudent or lucky investment on the
other. Cornick v Cornick (No 3) was disapproved on this point.
top
– a case in which it was accepted by a deputy High Court
judge that the assumed equality of value of financial and
domestic contributions only applied to marriages of substantial
length, and that assets brought into the marriage, including
a fully developed career and earning capacity, might qualify
as a contribution justifying a departure from equality.
The husband and wife met when they were both working for a
bank and lived together for about 18 months before marrying.
Although the marriage lasted for over 12 years, there was
a substantial period of about 18 months during which they
separated before attempting a reconciliation which resulted
in the birth of their two children. The husband was a financier,
and the substantial matrimonial assets of about £12
million had been built up from his earnings, bonuses and compensation
package. The wife asked for half the assets; the husband argued
that for a number of reasons, she should receive less than
half, although he did not argue special contribution by virtue
of having made a great deal of money.
The judge awarded the wife 40% of the assets. He noted that
where a relationship moved seamlessly from cohabitation to
marriage without any major alteration in the way in which
the couple lived, it was unreal and artificial to treat the
periods differently, and he included the period of cohabitation
as part of the ‘duration of the marriage’, but
excluded the separation period. Because the court was required
to consider duration of marriage, it would be contrary to
the statute, and fundamentally unfair, automatically to treat
domestic contributions made over 20 years in the same way
as domestic contributions made over 12 years. Not only the
property which the husband brought into the marriage, but
also his developed career, existing high earnings, and established
earning capacity at the time of the marriage, should be treated
as a contribution, unmatched in this case by any comparable
contribution by the wife. The period of separation was also
significant, as during it the husband was increasing the marital
assets, unmatched by any domestic contribution on the wife’s
part. top
–
a case in which the Court of Appeal commented on the application
of the current costs regime to big money cases.
Both cases concerned contested applications for financial
provision on divorce in which the judge had awarded the wife
roughly 50% of the considerable assets. Both judges had gone
on to consider the offers and counter-offers made by both
parties before making costs orders of, respectively, 80% costs
to the wife and 85% costs to the wife. The first husband had
argued before the judge that where assets were divided equally
and neither party had beaten their own Calderbank offer there
should be no order as to costs, but did not appeal the order
until 4 months after the hearing, over 3 months out of time.
The main issue raised by both appeals was the proper approach
of the court, after an award had been made in an ancillary
relief application, to the making of Calderbank offers.
The Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal out of time
in the first case, and refused leave to appeal in the second
case. The Court issued a number of important statements about
the application of the current rules as to costs to family
cases, particularly those in which a Calderbank offer had
been made, noting that the present rules might affect disproportionately
the payers in big money cases. In particular the Court confirmed
that in some offer and counter-offer cases, the proper approach
might well be, under the present procedure, to make no order
as to costs and to leave each party to pay his/her own costs.
The report of the Costs Sub-Committee of the President’s
Committee on Ancillary Relief had made a series of excellent
suggestions, many of a radical nature, which would meet the
current requirements in relation to costs in family financial
disputes.
Further may be found on:
http://www.manches.com/family/guidance/Manches-Cases.html
|
